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Abstract 
 
              The field of political socialization has been generally identified as a useful tool in the 
study of American political behavior. However, growing number of researchers urge for the 
expansion of the field due to its high potential for addressing vital issues in the study of 
comparative and international politics.  Utilizing post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine as 
theoretical model, this study discusses the expediency of political socialization framework in 
identifying nation-building techniques. Examination and comparison of youth political 
socialization policies in Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine revealed the unsuccessful attempts of 
the first post-Soviet government to create politically involved youth to be employed for 
generating political support. The study further exhibited the shift of the current administrations to 
create patriotically conscious, rather than politically active, youth to be used for generating and 
maintaining political approval for the existing regimes. 
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Introduction 
 
History was made when a Tunisian fruit-seller called Muhammad, frustrated by the lack 
of work and widespread corruption drenched himself in petrol. By lighting himself on fire, 
Muhammad initiated a revolutionary wave erasing long held preconceptions that Middle Eastern 
populace is doomed to live under autocratic regimes devoid of democratic ideals.  Almost 
miraculously the people of Tunisia overwhelmed the dictator and inspired uprisings in the 
region. Braving arrests and beatings, thousands have marched in Tehran. Paying with their lives, 
protesters resisted governmental forces in tiny Bahrain.  In Libya, a divided citizenry has been 
fighting a ruthless dictator. Egypt erupted in a wave of antigovernment protest forcing the 
president to flee. Jordan’s protesters carried out their mission despite the fearsome suppression. 
Algeria is unstable and Yemen is seething.  
 Similarly to Europe’s triumphant overthrow of communism in 1989 and recent color 
revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, this revolutionary wave was a product of a growing 
generational gap. Inspired by the possibility of change, a young generation has suddenly found 
its voice. This generational change of mentality, as well as the organizational genius of youthful 
campaigners, is attributed to be the main force behind these revolutions.   
As change swept through the Middle East, this generational revolt has raised questions about 
youth potential to overthrow entrenched political regimes in other parts of the world. Researchers 
examined the possibility of similar uprisings erupting in autocratic regimes by monitoring 
multiple factors such as GDP per person, unemployment rates, and percentage of population 
under the age of 25. Such factors fail to predict how the youth revolutionary forces will play out 
across the variety of autocratic regimes, due to each country’s unique socioeconomic, political 
and historic development. To gain a greater insight into the possibility of youth initiated uprising 
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erupting in a specific country, it is crucial to examine state-society relations; specifically the type 
of civil society and political values that the administration in power is trying to cultivate within 
its youth population.  
Political socialization is a subfield of political science that examines precisely the type of 
civil society that the ruling administration is inculcating within its population. Governmental 
youth doctrines provide an effective method of identifying governmental youth political 
socialization agenda. The civic education and ideological values imparted to the youth 
population through the doctrine would serve as a potential indicator of the political philosophy 
imbibed by the future civic society. Identifying governmental youth politicization agendas allows 
one to demonstrate the likely political tendencies of future civil society and the degree of 
governmental vulnerability to youth mobilization. 
This study examines Russian, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani governments’ youth 
socialization policies. With varying patterns of political institutionalization and degrees of 
democratization, the countries offer a cohesive comparative dimension. Focusing on youth 
policy can assist us in forecasting the potential future of the examined country’s political regime, 
particularly its vulnerability to antigovernment mobilization as the youth population comes of 
age politically.  
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Literature Review 
 
For any given country to be able to successfully continue its existing regime, citizens 
must fulfill their responsibilities to the state. In a democracy, the citizen’s task entails 
communicating to the government, primarily by voting, their concerns and preferences about 
public policy. For citizens to be able to fulfill their civic responsibilities they must possess a 
certain amount of political knowledge about the existing regime (Pye, 1972).  
Political socialization is a subfield of political science that examines citizens’ formal and 
informal civic education. Herbert Hyman’s (1969) Political Socialization provided the name as 
well as initial contributions for a new field. Hyman defined political socialization as “learning of 
social patterns corresponding to a citizen’s societal positions as mediated through various 
agencies of society” (Sapiro, 2004, 20). Scholars define political socialization as a reproduction 
and development of political culture in a society, through the process where citizens learn to 
accept and agree to the existing societal norms, values and models of political behavior).  
Political socialization occurs through the major societal institutions such as schools, mass 
media, families, political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and governmental institutions 
(Sapiro, 2004, 15). Families play an important role in the first stage of political socialization, as 
children discover psychological basis for political orientations, attitudes, and models of political 
behavior.Educational institutions provide formal base for children’s civic education introducing 
such concepts as constitutional rights, political participation, and citizenship responsibilities.    
Mass media further introduces characteristics of the dominant political culture into the 
consciousness of a person. Scholars recognize that there is no universal agreement on the 
content, longevity, and stages in the process of political socialization. 
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Study of the political learning process can be differentiated into cultural and institutional 
theories (Mishler, 2007, 825). The cultural theory of political learning emphasizes the 
importance of youth socialization, arguing that people are taught from an early age to develop 
regime support. Generational differences therefore are considered important, because different 
generations acquire their political values during different historical periods as well under 
different socio-economic conditions. Institutional theories emphasize that attitudes are adaptable 
and therefore change over the course of a life time (Nikolayenko, 2008, 148). Generational 
differences tend to diminish as all generations go through the same cycle. Current research in 
political socialization focuses on a new lifetime learning model which emphasizes the 
importance of early socialization, but also suggests that, in a society that is undergoing rapid 
transformation, adult learning becomes a dominant factor in determining political attitudes 
(Mishler, 2007, 230). Political Socialization could potentially provide a framework for 
examining issues beyond civic education, such as development of state political ideology and 
civic engagement.  Unfortunately most of the research efforts in political socialization are limited 
to the study of citizenship in the United States and other industrial western countries. 
Researchers emphasized the need to explore political socialization beyond areas of American 
political behavior (Sapiro, 2004, 5). Furthermore, the lack of comparative perspective on the 
topic indicates a significant gap in political socialization framework.   
The fall of many authoritarian regimes in the 1980s provided an ideal research area to 
expand the study of political socialization.  The fall of Soviet Union created newly established 
democratic regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. However, within a decade researchers 
observed that, while some countries were able to strengthen their democratic government, others 
experienced democratic erosion, or even the re-emergence of authoritarian regimes. Noticeable 
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shifts away from democracy led many researchers to focus on examining the new political order 
that replaced previously democratic systems of governance.  
Researchers tend to overlook the significance of political socialization when searching 
for the traces of new political ideology in transitional regimes. The most prominent work related 
to political socialization in post-Soviet states has been conducted by Douglas Blum (2006A, 
2007, 98). Blum describes the evident presence of patriotism in political socialization efforts 
carried out by the Russian and Azerbaijani governments. Examination of political socialization 
was not the main focus of Blum’s research.  Blum acknowledged that further examination of 
governmental politicization policy was necessary.  Richard Rose and William Mishler also 
contributed to the field by examining the dynamics of political leaning during Russia’s post-
Soviet transformation utilizing survey research aptly named The New Russian Barometer 
(Mishler, 2007, 832 ). 
Unlike the subject of political socialization, scholars have demonstrated greater interest in 
examining post-Soviet youth. Despite the plethora of research devoted to studying post-Soviet 
youth, the majority of the literature focuses on describing certain political attitudes of youth1, or 
youth elites; educated young adults that are more active in politics, such as members of Russian 
youth group NASHI (Frierson, 2007, 12) Limited efforts have been made to examine the 
development of such attitudes, through the governmental policies. As such, past research has 
neglected the evolution of post-Soviet youth’s political attitudes as a means to understand the 
larger political reality of transitional regimes. 
One stream of very limited research, devoted partially to youth political socialization, 
focuses on describing the changes within the educational curriculum to inculcate patriotic 
sentiments amongst Russian2, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani youth. Similarly, Taraz Kuzio briefly 
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mentions Putin’s new educational reform and the creation of the pro-governmental youth 
movement Nashi in his description of increasing nationalistic sentiments among Russian youth.  
The evident lack of research devoted to the study of political socialization demonstrates the 
necessity for further exploration of the subject. Furthermore, introducing a comparative 
dimension would expand the framework beyond its current use in the study of American political 
behavior.   
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Execution 
 
The goal of this section is to discuss the modes of institutionalizing the process of youth 
socialization and politicization. The section introduces official apparatus for policymaking in 
each sample county by discussing institutions responsible for the execution and monitoring of 
state youth policies. In addition, the section provides summary of the major policy legislations 
which contemplate youth doctrines in each country.  
Institutions and Policies 
Historically in the Soviet Union, political socialization was carried out in a top-down 
approach, where government took the lead in citizen’s political learning (Balabanov, 1999, 86 ). 
The Soviet government had a strict policy under which the youth learned fundamental values of 
communist political ideology.  Immediately after independence, authorities recognized the feeble 
state of youth policies in newly established states. The situation affecting youth, including what 
was viewed as moral and political degradation, generated significant concern for policymakers. 
However, the fledgling state structures were overwhelmed by the immediate necessity to 
establish sovereignty and manage pressing crises in virtually all areas of governance.  
Consequently, youth policies were hastily formed at the time of Soviet dissolution and consisted 
mainly of incoherent legislatures. Lacking systematic legal and institutional foundations, early 
policies served as only temporary solutions and in reality, existed mainly on paper (Blum, 2007, 
110).  As the old system of institutional oversight slowly disintegrated, youth was left largely 
unsupervised. Governmental reports and international monitoring projects recognized the 
limitations of youth policies and the consequences which resulted from the existing situation.   
The early 1990s were characterized mainly by the creation of general “concept 
statements” and “target programs”(Diuk, 2004, 60). The content of youth programs consisted of 
8 
 
only general objectives. Ideological aims were mentioned cautiously in the early post-Soviet 
context. In addition, the lack of appropriate institutions for executing and monitoring of policies 
contributed to the general inadequacy of earlier youth policies. After declaring independence, 
national governments began to restructure Soviet institutions. Newly established ministries often 
lacked conventional bureaucracies and were frequently restructured. As a result, ministries often 
disputed authority over execution and monitoring of policies.  
Policymakers recognized that the absence of appropriate provisions for youth 
socialization and the influences of cultural globalization resulted in a generation of youth 
characterized by the lack of adherences to the state. By the early 2000s, concern over new 
allegiances of youth, which could undermine the prospect of constructing a coherent national 
identity, led to the development of official doctrines and in some cases genuine laws regarding 
youth policies.  
Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijan’s youth policy has been largely unchanged since its establishment by 
President Gaidar Aliev. From 1994 until 2009, more than 20 initiatives on youth policy including 
governmental policies, presidential and parliamentary decrees were implemented. However, only 
two major policies were implemented in 2002 and 2005 (Blum, 2007, 112)(http://www.guam-
youth.info/content/view/78/1/) The Ministry of Youth and Sports (named Sports, Youth and 
Tourism from 2001-2006)established in 1994, was tasked with overseeing youth policy which 
was identified as a vital national task. To accommodate the development of youth policy, Aliev 
established a Center of Scientific Research of Youth Problems under the Ministry of Youth and 
Sports. Various outlines and decrees of national youth policy were presented starting from 1996 
culminating in a policy titled “On realization of State Youth Policy” in 1999. Aliev personally 
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oversaw the formation of youth policy. The legislation titled “On Youth Policy” was 
implemented in 2002. The legislation reflects the dictatorial nature of Aliev regime.  The policy 
lacks juridical accountability, leaving significant power in the hands of central and local 
officials. Neither the content of youth doctrine, nor the policy mechanisms changed after Ilham 
Aliev succeeded his father in 2003.  A new youth program titled “Azerbaijani Youth (2005-
2009)” was signed in 2005. The program followed the principles underlined in the 2002 law on 
youth policy without any substantial changes. President Aliev also established 2007 as “Youth 
Year” by a presidential degree.  
Russia 
In the newly established Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin carried out a series of youth 
reforms. On June 30th, 1991The State Committee of Russian Federation on Youth Policy was 
created. Its structure and functions were finalized in October. However, by November the 
Committee was liquidated with all of its functions transferred to the Ministry of Education.  A 
new post of the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Russian Federation on Youth Affairs 
was created and quickly abolished by the end of 1992. In September 1992, a new Committee on 
Youth Affairs was created. In the beginning of 1994, Committee of the Russian Federation on 
Youth Affairs, Physical Training and Tourism was formed. The previous Committee on Youth 
Affairs was liquidated only to be formed again in about four months. 
In the midst of institutional restructuring, some legislature outlining the principles of 
youth policy was adopted by the government. The first cohesive policy was introduced only by 
the middle of 1990s. On June 3, 1992 a first document which clearly indicated the agenda of 
governmental youth policy titled “Main Directions of the State Youth Policy in the Russian 
Federation” was introduced to the parliament.By August 1992, a new federal budget attempted to 
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provide financial assistance for youth policy by including a section titled «Financing of actions 
in the field of Youth Policy». The next major federal program directed toward youth 
socialization called “The Youth of Russia (1995-1997)” was adopted by the government on 
November 25, 1994 
President Yeltsin took an active personal role in the formation of youth policy. Yeltsin 
frequently initiated youth outreach campaigns such as “Letter to the President”. The president 
also established official youth day and took initiative to meet with leaders of youth 
organizations. However, the absence of coherent youth legislation and financial provisions 
persisted.  Frequent restructuring of federal agencies, responsible for the formation and 
implementation of youth policy, served as an additional milestone that resulted in a largely 
ineffective policy.  
 Vladimir Putin was able to utilize previously established institutions for executing his 
youth policy. However, the content of youth policy changed drastically under Putin 
administration. The first youth policy issued during Putin’s presidency was a decree titled 
“About military-patriotic youth and children’s associations” (N 551) from July 24, 20001.  On 
December 27, 2000 governmental program “Russian Youth (2001-2005)”was implemented2.  
The program was Vladimir Putin’s first major youth policy. On February 16, 2001, the 
governmental program “Patriotic education of citizens of the Russian Federation (2001-2005)” 
was launched and replaced by “Patriotic Education of Russian Citizens (2006-2010) in 2005 .3 
Despite the fact that both programs were oriented toward all social strata and age groups of 
Russian citizens rather than youth specifically, it is still important to examine the policy due to 
its inevitable effect on youth. The next youth policy was stated to be “Russian Youth (2006-
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2010); however it was never approved. Instead, on December 18, 2006, a new policy was passed 
titled “The strategy of governmental youth policy of Russian Federation until the year of 2016”4. 
Ukraine 
Since achieving independence, Ukrainian authorities recognized the importance of 
creating and maintaining a coherent youth policy.  Starting from President Leonid Kravchuk, 
Ukrainian authorities established national youth policy. However, early 1990s period, under 
LeonidKravchuk and Leonid Kuchma’s administrations, served primarily as a drafting process, 
which created concept statements and target youth programs (Kuzio; 2009, 42).  
Originally, Ukrainian Ministry of Family, Youth and Sport was responsible for 
developing and implementing national youth policy. In 1996, the Ministry was restructured to 
encompass wider responsibilities and was remained Ministry of Youth and Family. Further 
restructuring resulted in the creation of Governmental Committee on Youth and Family Affairs. 
It was once again restructured in 2000 with an official title of Ukrainian Governmental 
Committee on Youth Policy, Sport and Tourism. In 2005, the Committee was restructured once 
again into a Governmental Ministry of Family, Children and Youth only to be transformed six 
months later into Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports Affairs. In December 2010 the Ministry 
was reorganized to include jurisdiction over education and science. The new institution is called 
Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science, Youth and Sport.  
The first Ukrainian youth policy after independence was passed as a declaration on 
December 15th 1992 titled “On General Principles of State Youth Policy in Ukraine”. The 1992 
policy provided legal foundations for further development of the state youth policy.  The 
following year, a more detailed legislature titled “On Promotion of Social Advancement and 
Youth Development in Ukraine” was implemented.  President Leonid Kuchma implemented his 
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first youth policy during his second term in office. In 2002, a legislature titled “About the Main 
Concepts of Pre-military Training and Military-Patriotic Education of Youth” outlined the main 
concepts of governmental patriotic and military education agenda. Only by the end of 2003, 
Kuchma implemented a coherent governmental youth policy titled “National Youth Support 
Program for Years 2004-2008”. President Kuchma introduced a separate legislature in 2003 
designed to increase professional competitiveness and recruit greater number of youth for 
governmental service. By the end of Kuchma’s second term, Ukraine had an established youth 
policy and a semi functioning framework for its implementation. Ukrainian policy under 
President Victor Yushchenko was mainly a continuation of the previously established doctrine. 
To accommodate the established youth doctrine, Yushchenko introduced a legislature 
proclaiming 2009 as national “Youth Year”.  Yushenko introduces a new legislature titled 
“Ukrainian Youth (2009-2015)” which served as a continuation of Kuchma’s youth policy.  
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Concepts 
This section provides a summary of the main ideological aims reinforced in youth 
policies. To provide a cohesive overview of governmental politicization agenda, the evaluation 
focuses on identifying particularly vital political socialization objectives. The study identifies the 
extent to which each policy aims to promote: nationalistic sentiments, patriotism, civic 
education, political participation, integration with the EU and western countries. In addition, the 
evaluation identifies any changes in policy after Color revolutions and governmental relation 
with NGOs and youth organizations. Evaluation of the above-mentioned ideological objectives 
would serve as an indicator of the established political regime and give an insight into the 
potential nature of the future political order in each country.  
1.Nationalism 
Evaluating the extent to which nationalism is reinforced in youth doctrine would provide an 
important insight into the governmental ideological ambitions. If nationalism is greatly 
emphasized in youth policy, it is important to identify the definition that is being utilized in 
youth doctrines. Nationalism based on anti-Western sentiments could serve as an indicator of 
potentially hostile and uncooperative youth attitudes. Nationalism based on ethnic superiority 
could lead to greater tensions for national minorities.  
2.Patriotism 
Evaluation of patriotism is equally important in identifying ideological aims of governmental 
political socialization agenda.Promotion of patriotism is not abnormal; however, if the definition 
of patriotism is designed to reinforce blind support for the established order rather than the 
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nation, its history and traditions, increase in patriotism would be highly undesirable for the 
process of democratic development. 
3.Civism/ Civic education 
Encouraging general interest in politics and greater political participation from the population 
serves as an indicator of a democratically oriented government. Politically involved citizens tend 
to voice their opinions and provide check and balances to the government by utilizing voting 
power during elections. However, encouraging political participation while discouraging interest 
in politics creates a potentially hazardous situation, where citizens vote without sufficient 
information to make an intelligent decision. Consequently, administration in power has greater 
chance of remaining in control of the government.     
4.Western/European Integration 
Advocacy of western and European integration would serve as an additional indicator of 
democratically oriented government. However, encouragement of economic integration without 
advocating political and cultural exchange does not reflect governmental promotion of 
democratic values. 
5.Change of policy after Color Revolutions 
Color revolutions provided an important and threatening message to the largely autocratic 
regimes in the region. Youth played a critical role in the organization and execution of color 
revolutions. Consequently, it is important to note any change in the nature of youth policies 
directed toward prevention of youth uprisings. 
6.Relations with youth organizations/NGOs 
The amount of involvement which youth and nongovernmental organizations had in the 
formation and execution of youth policies would demonstrate the nature of governmental 
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relations with such organizations. Autocratic regimes, with strict control over youth doctrine, 
would not allow third party involvement in the formation of youth policies.  
7.Other 
It is important to leave room for any particularly interesting governmental youth socialization 
objectives that can vary between countries and individual youth policies.  
 
Azerbaijan 
Azerbaijani youth policy remained largely unchanged from the first major legislature 
which was implemented by President Gaindar Aliev in 2002. After Ilhan Aliev succeeded his 
father a continuation of the previously established policy was implemented in 2005. All major 
legislatures emphasize patriotic education, international youth integration, and encourage the 
development of youth organizations and NGOs. The examination of governmental youth 
political socialization objectives revealed ulterior motives of the governmental policies.  
 
1. In the official youth doctrine nationalism was discouraged. Due to the large presence of ethnic 
minorities in Azerbaijan, significant emphasis is also placed on combating religious and ethnic 
intolerance.  
 
2. Patriotic education was identified as one of the most vital objectives of youth doctrine. The 
youth legislation emphasizes the need to instruct principles of patriotism and Azerbaijanism in 
youth. Patriotism was defined as love for Azerbaijan, its cultural traditions, history and language. 
Promotion of patriotic education also intended to serve as a preparation for future military 
service. To execute patriotic education agenda the policy supported organization of military-
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patriotic sports games and competitions. Together with the Ministry of Education, Defense and 
State Border Service the military- patriotic games such as “Shahin”(falcons), and 
“Cesurlar”(braves) were implemented (Country sheet on youth policy – Azerbaijan, 2010). 
Variety of media programs such as military themed television and radio programs, movies and 
plays were designed to provide additional support for the patriotic education agenda. To further 
promote patriotic education especially designed clubs for patriotic education of youth were 
established across the country.    
 
3. The development of active civic society was only briefly mentioned in youth doctrine. The 
creation of favorable conditions for active participation of youth in public and political life of the 
country was identified as one of overall policy objectives. However, neither specific programs 
nor further provisions to support the objective were mentioned. 
 
4. International youth cooperation was generally encouraged by the policy. However, only 
professional and economic integration was mentioned. The policy advocated combating western 
influences and lifestyle values, while simultaneously encouraging professional integration 
(Blum, 2007, 122). Development of tourism was particularly mentioned as one of the goals of 
greater international youth cooperation.  
 
5. The second major youth policy was implemented on August 30th 2005 after the Ukrainian and 
Kyrgyz color revolutions.  No visible changes were made to the youth policy in particular in its 
relations with youth organizations. Youth organizations were encouraged to take active role in 
the implementation of youth doctrine. However, it is important to note that majority of 
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Azerbaijani youth organizations are loyal to the established regime particularly to the president. 
Under such circumstances there was no need for the government to try to restrict activities of 
youth organizations.  
 
6. Azerbaijani youth policies are slightly more tolerant of NGOs and youth organizations than 
many post-Soviet countries. However, majority of NGOs and youth organizations are in direct 
cooperation with the federal government and often serve as a support group for the President.   
 
7. A substantial part of the policy is dedicated to solving practical socio-economic issues such as 
youth employment and housing.  
Conclusion 
Azerbaijani youth doctrine prioritizes patriotic education and international youth cooperation. 
Patriotic education was defined as developing sentiments of love for Azerbaijan, its history and 
traditions. Consequently, the patriotic agenda underlying youth legislation does not trigger large 
concern. Encouragement of international youth cooperation appears to indicate a more 
democratic nature of the legislature. However, only professional cooperation is encouraged; 
largely in order to raise professional qualifications of Azerbaijani youth.  Simultaneously, the 
policy advocates combating western influences and lifestyle values. The policy also supports 
NGOs and youth organizations; however, the overwhelming majority of such organizations are 
sympathizers of the regime and President Aliev.  Azerbaijani youth doctrine represents semi 
authoritarian regime where, according to the policy, patriotic and politically loyal youth would 
serve to ensure the continuation of the current regime.  
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Russia 
Post-Soviet youth policies of Yeltsin and Putin’s administrations, engaged in a top-down 
approach towards youth political socialization. Both administrations were motivated in their 
policies due to the continuing socio-political degradation of Russian youth. Due to the 
fundamental differences in the main objectives of Yeltsin and Putin’s youth doctrine it is 
necessary to examine them independently. Yeltsin’s policies focused on establishing 
methodological, legislative and financial framework for executing coherent youth doctrine 
(Belyaeva, 2004, 38 ). His policies served mainly to outline the necessary direction of youth 
policy without the appropriate means for implementation.  Yeltsin’s reforms encouraged greater 
political involvement of youth in political and social life of the country. The main objectives of 
his legislation focused on creating positive socioeconomic conditions that would allow 
adolescents to realize their full potential. An emphasis was put on encouraging youth to take 
initiative in achieving economic independence through entrepreneurship activities rather than 
civic activism (Ob Osnobnix Napravleniax Gosydarstvennoi Molodezhnoy Politiki v Rocciickoi 
Federazii, 1993).Putin was able to use the established institutions and laws to begin executing his 
own youth doctrine. Putin’s youth policies focused on utilizing youth potential to advance his 
governmental aims by maintaining the political status quo (Colton, 2000). Focusing on 
promoting patriotic education, Putin’s policies aimed to control and use youth as a strategic 
resource for strengthening the established regime. According to youth doctrine patriotic 
sentiments would serve as a unifying block for building Russia’s new national identity. Under 
Putin’s administration, western integration was allowed only on a professional level in order to 
raise youth competitiveness on an international scale. Simultaneously youth was expected to 
counter foreign ideological influences.  
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Boris Yeltsin 
 
1. Yeltsin’s policies focused on promoting sentiments of unity among youth while discouraging 
nationalism (O Federalnoi Programme ‘Mologezh Rossii’, 1994). Youth policies also promoted 
the development in youth sentiments of respect for other nations and observance of human 
rights. However, due to the absence of coherent youth legislation majority on programs focused 
on developing a legal and theoretical framework for executing policy objectives.  
 
2. Developing patriotic sentiments in youth was viewed as a particularly vital aspect of youth 
policy. After the fall of Soviet Union, governmental official recognized the need to redefine the 
notion of patriotism to signify love for Russia, its history, culture, and traditions. Youth 
programs suggested organizing festivals with patriotic theme and other similar events. However, 
even with priority given to the promotion of patriotic education agenda, youth policy gave much 
greater urgency to promoting socio-economic agenda.  
 
3. Civic education was mentioned briefly in Yeltsin’s youth political socialization agenda 
without any specific provisions for executing the objective. Early 1990s period was marked by 
rapid transformation of Russian political system making civic education almost impossible to 
execute. Without stable constitution and established system of governance civic education was 
largely ignored in educational system.  
 
4. The beginning of 1990s generated a large fascination with western and European nations in 
Russia(Robinson, John, 1993, 519). Yeltsin’s youth policies reflected this growing interest. 
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Youth legislation encouraged Russian youth to integrate with adolescence from European and 
other western nations. Multiple exchange programs and international youth forums were created 
to advance greater integration.    
 
6. Yeltsin’s youth programs encouraged NGOs including international agencies and youth 
organizations to take an active role in developing and executing youth legislation. Yeltsin’s 
legislation particularly encouraged the formation of new youth organizations. Adolescence were 
encouraged to voice their opinion about their most pressing concerns that should be included in 
youth legislature.   
Putin 
Putin’s youth policies reflect greater governmental preoccupation with adolescents. 
Putin’s uniform state policies were designed to consolidate and coordinate all previous youth 
policies of the federal and local governments. The new youth doctrine demonstrated 
governmental desire to control all aspects of youth political, moral, and socioeconomic 
development. Putin’s numerous policies devoted to patriotic education signified growing concern 
of his administration over the lack of military-patriotic values in Russian youth(Sakwa, 2008). 
 
1.Putin’s youth doctrine demonstrated governmental concern over the growing nationalistic 
sentiments among Russian youth. Putin’s youth policies seek to eradicate nationalistic 
sentiments; however the definition of patriotism and some of the language used in his policies 
unintentionally promoted further development of nationalistic sentiments. The reliance of youth 
doctrine on utilizing patriotic consciousness, rather than more inclusive values such as 
multiculturalism, as the main unifying block for Russian society indirectly promoted nationalism 
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among youth.  The main programs for patriotic education were centered on perpetration of pride 
for Russian state, its citizens, and the government. The emphasis on Russia and Russian citizens 
in patriotic education legislation excludes non citizens such as migrant workers and other from 
identifying themselves with the new Russian society.   
 
2.Putin devoted significant attention to increasing patriotic sentiments not only among Russian 
youth, but also the general public1. According to youth doctrine, reestablishment of largely 
eradicated patriotic sentiments was alleged to serve as a base for consolidation of the population 
and strengthening of the state. The main strategic objective of patriotic education programs was 
formation of patriotic consciousness that would become the most important value for Russian 
citizens and thus lead to spiritual-moral unity of the country. Patriotism was intended to serve as 
a unifying base for Russian population. 
Starting for the first policy, Putin established military-patriotic associations which were 
defined as voluntarily organized, self-governing, non-commercial citizen’s association directed 
toward patriotic education of youth and children. The associations were sponsored by federal 
funding and were designed to execute governmental patriotic education agenda. Patriotic 
education was defined as “a systematic and purposeful governmental activity in the formation 
among citizens of a patriotic mentality, the feeling of loyalty to the fatherland, and readiness to 
fulfill civic duty and constitutional responsibilities on protection of the interests of the 
fatherland”. Specific goals of patriotic education agenda included development of the sense of 
fidelity to Russia, and readiness to fulfill military service. The associations also served to execute 
wider ideological and moral objectives of Putin’s youth policy. The centers were supposed to 
eradicate potential youth displays of political and religious extremism by promoting 
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governmentally approved patriotic education agenda. Later programs devoted to patriotic 
education of youth served to continue execution of the established socialization objectives. 
However, a growing effort was devoted to the enhancement of methodological framework for 
further patriotic education programs. 
The vehicles for implementation of the policy included governmental and public 
organizations, educational institutions, and mass media. The use of mass media to execute 
patriotic education agenda was particularly noticeable. Media was to be used as a tool for 
propaganda of patriotism. Multiple programs recommended the creation of special programs to 
counteract what was seen as an inadequate depiction of Russian achievements in historical 
events such as World War 2. The use of mass media also included creation of patriotic movies, 
literature work, plays, and educational textbooks etc. It was also openly suggested that 
educational institutions would serve as the main base for patriotic education of the next 
generation of Russian youth. All policies were designed to use innovative technology as well as 
newly researched and expanded methodological base for successful incorporation of patriotic 
upbringing into the educational system.  The need was also expressed for greater patriotic 
emphasis in the social science departments of higher education. 
Unlike previous youth programs, financing for programs devoted to patriotic education 
were largely provided from the federal budget.  For example total financing of the program 
amounted to 177, 95 million rubbles, from which 130, 78 million (around 74%) was provided by 
the federal budget, and only 14, 50 million from sources outside of federal budget.  
3 Similarly to Ukrainian and Azerbaijani youth policies, the civic education agenda was largely 
absent from Putin’s legislation (Cherkezova, 1999, 41). Despite the fact that numerous  
1Programs devoted to military-patriotic education include: “About military-patriotic youth and children’s associations” (N 551) from July 24, 
20001, “Patriotic education of citizens of the Russian Federation (2001-2005)”, Patriotic Education of Russian Citizens (2006-2010)5 
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governmental reports indicated the growing concern over politically disengaged youth 
tendencies, Putin’s policies lacked civic education programs. The policy recognized that a 
strategy should be developed to increase youth participation in elections, and the overall political 
life of the country; however, no specifics means for implementation were identified.  
The lack of emphasis on civic education became more apparent in Putin’s later policies 
(Evans, 2005). After color revolutions in the region revealed youth potential for mobilization, 
Putin’s youth policy indicated an attempt to limit and control youth participation political affairs. 
Youth doctrine was centralized on the objective of creating economically successful and 
patriotically conscious, while concurrently politically uneducated and inactive youth.  
 
4. Putin’s youth doctrine demonstrated a rapid shift in governmental policy toward western 
integration. Unlike Yeltsin’s youth policies, Putin’s doctrine actively discouraged promotion of 
western political and cultural influences. Youth doctrine emphasized the need to counter what 
was portrayed as immoral foreign influences and any attempt by foreign power to influence 
Russia’s political regime. A combination of patriotically conscious and politically unintelligent 
youth was seen as a strategic resource that would serve to counter any potential foreign attempt 
to threaten Russia’s political order.   European and western integration was only tolerated in the 
professional realm. Professional integration of Russia’s youth into European and western 
societies was designed to increase competitiveness of Russian youth on an international level. 
 
5. Color revolutions revealed the tremendous youth potential to change an established 
governmental regime. After the turbulent events in the region took place, politicized youth was 
viewed by the administration as threatening.  Consequently, largely symbolic prior emphasis of 
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the youth policy on encouraging political involvement from youth gradually diminished. In a 
conflicting policy objective, the new youth doctrine identified adolescents as the main societal 
group that will be responsible for the pace of Russia’s future democratic development.  Youth’s 
beliefs in the stable immediate future was said to be the determining factor in successful 
continuation of Russia’s regime. According to the policy, youth should be trained to resist 
political manipulations and extremist appeals of the sort that were operating in the Orange 
Revolution.  The policy demonstrates governmental desire to mobilize youth in case of political 
unrest as a counter revolutionary force.  The two policy objectives appear contradictory. The 
strive to create apolitical yet easily mobilized youth that would be responsible for preserving 
Russia’s political order demonstrate governmental desire to utilize youth as an easily 
manipulated resource. The creation of politically uneducated and highly patriotic youth would 
eliminate the possibility of an antigovernment mobilization.  
 
6. In the early stages of development, Putin’s youth doctrine was relatively tolerant of non-
governmental organizations’ attempt to influence the formation of youth legislation. The 
Department of Youth encouraged direct participation of youth and other actors in policymaking. 
Opinion of the Department of Youth about the formation process and content of youth doctrine 
was not shared by Putin’s administration. According to the State Council’s, which represented 
Putin’s opinion, the process of youth socialization should be strictly under state control 
(“Doktrinamolodezhi Rossii”).  By 2002 the two opposing opinions were expressed in the form 
of separate documents outlining the desired youth policy objectives. Gradually, State Council’s 
vision of the proper socialization process prevailed.  Approved non-governmental organizations 
were encouraged to participate in the execution of patriotic education policy; however they were 
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largely ignored during the drafting stages of legislation on the subject. The state remained the 
leading and uniting source behind youth policies. As Douglas Blum argues, Putin’s youth policy  
“…corresponds to and directly furthers Putin’s view of how to transform Russian state and 
society from the top down, while seeking to limit grassroots democratization and freedom of 
expression.” (Blum 2006 B)  
 
7. Youth doctrine aimed to create financially and economically self-sufficient youth capable of 
solving problems without further governmental assistance. Independent, economically 
successful, apolitical youth would lead to further strengthening of Russian state without political 
threat to the current administration.   
Conclusion 
Implementation of youth policies was recognized as an essential feature of the 
government strategy to overcome the increasingly negative tendencies among youth.  Negative 
inclinations were identified as a degradation of cultural and moral capital, and amplified mistrust 
of power institutions amongst the younger population.   
Russian youth doctrine under Yeltsin’s administration reflects democratic socialization 
objectives. Yeltsin’s policies encouraged political participation, and the development and 
resurrection of democratic values such as: civism, respect for human rights, other nations, as well 
as the history and culture of Russia.  
Putin’s essentially authoritarian youth doctrine has remained largely unchanged since the 
beginning of his administration. The main objectives of Putin’s youth policies were to discourage 
interest in politics, imposing a patriotic ideology through mass propaganda, mobilizing selected 
youth for political support and countering foreign ideological influences (Mendelson, 2008, 
26 
 
141).Putin’s youth doctrine was focused on promoting a patriotic socialization programs. The 
new youth doctrine was designed to strengthen the Russian state by unifying the population 
under a patriotic mentality. Youth policies aimed to promote the widespread adoption of a 
national patriotic consciousness using the means of mass propaganda, educational institutions, 
and specifically designed youth associations. Patriotically conscious youth were viewed as a 
strategic resource that should be utilized to preserve the established political order. After the 
color revolutions in the region, Putin’s youth doctrine aimed to mobilize youth to combat any 
potential foreign ideological influences from seeping into mainstream Russian society. 
Integration with Western thought and ideology was particularly discouraged after the turbulent 
events in the region.  Similarly to Ukrainian and Azerbaijani youth doctrines, Putin’s legislation 
lacks significant emphasis on promoting a civic education agenda. The growth of an apolitical 
mentality and general disinterest in political life of the country amongst Russian youth was 
alarming for many governmental officials; however, at the same time, the youth doctrine 
remained unconcerned with the issue. Furthermore the policy seems to encourage apolitical 
attitudes among youth.  
 
Ukraine 
Ukrainian first independent youth policies, implemented by President Kravchuk, focused 
primarily on four central objectives: identifying the existent socioeconomic conditions of youth, 
developing legal and material framework for successful development and self-realization of 
youth potential, increasing active participation of adolescents in the national and cultural revival 
as well as the overall social and economical life of the country. The majority of youth policies 
that followed Kravchuk’s initial initiative simply added more objectives to the existing youth 
27 
 
doctrine. President Kuchma solidified the main governmental youth socialization objectives in 
his youth legislation. Yushchenko’s youth policies serves as a continuation of the preexisting 
policies. 
Ukrainian policies had moderate emphasis on developing patriotic sentiments among 
youth. Youth policies accentuated the need to develop educated and engaged civil society. 
However, civil activism was defined as social rather than political engagement. The majority of 
youth policies emphasized the importance of creating separate regional youth policies based on 
the main federal doctrine. Examination of multiple regional legislatures demonstrated virtually 
identical correlation between federal and local policies. Regional governments served mainly as 
implementers of the federally approved youth agenda (Youth policy of Lugansk region 2007-
2010).Federal and local governments provided financial support for the state youth policy. 
Further contributions from private individuals and approved non-governmental organizations and 
well as private enterprises were encouraged.  
 
1.Ukrainian youth policies promote ethnic tolerance and actively discourage nationalism. Many 
of the original youth policies greatly emphasize the concept of Ukrainian sovereignty. In first 
policies youth was portrayed as serving major role in preserving the newly acquired 
independence. The creation of national unity was not based on ethno-nationalistic sentiments due 
to the large presence of ethnically diverse population. 
 
2.Youth doctrine prioritized patriotic education, in particular developing in youth sentiments of 
national pride, patriotism, and willingness to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty. However, patriotism 
was framed as passive and apolitical love for Ukraine as a nation and its symbols. The doctrine 
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defined patriotic education as formation in youth sentiments of national pride, ethic tolerance, 
respect for Ukrainian history and constitution. Patriotism was equated to passivity, predictability, 
and order (Kuzio, 2005, 109).In order to achieve the desired patriotic objectives the policy 
identified necessary steps that needed to be enforced by the government. Such steps included: 
reforming, with the help of military representatives, pre military-patriotic education of youth, 
providing additional support for patriotic youth organizations, promoting traditional cultural 
values of Ukrainian nation, and popularizing patriotic values through creation of patriotic 
computer games.  
Yushchenko devoted even greater emphasis to patriotic education in his youth doctrine. 
Yushchenko signed a presidential decree establishing 2009 the year of youth. Among other 
goals, the decree called for a formation and implementation of national-patriotic youth education 
doctrine and the development of an all-Ukrainian center for patriotic education. Similarly to 
previous policies, the decree promoted utilizing passive patriotic education techniques. The 
national-patriotic doctrine prioritized the development of national pride sentiments, respect for 
history and constitution among youth. Yushchenko’s increased attention to patriotic education 
could be interpreted as a possible attempt of creating a new youth support group during a 
turbulent democratic transformation of the country.  
 
3. The policy devoted even greater attention to the creation of active youth civic society.  
President Kuchma developed policy to encourage higher level of youth involvement in federal 
and local government.  The policy created a framework for standardized recruitment and training 
of highly qualified youth for future governmental service. Selected individuals were qualified for 
special rotational programs within governmental offices. Successful candidates also received 
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educational training in the form of advanced degrees in Public Administration at the National 
Academy of Public Administration under the Ukrainian President. The long term aim of the 
policy was creation of qualified managerial elites and overall increase in the number of young 
civil servants.  In addition, legislation identified facilitation greater youth involvement in social, 
political, and economic transformation process, as well as Ukraine’s integration into the global 
community as the main policy goals.  
 
4. Promotion of greater integration of Ukrainian youth into European and International 
community was greatly emphasized in youth policies (Society in transition. social change in 
Ukraine in western perspective, 2003). Integration of Ukrainian youth into the EU in particular 
was emphasized in nearly every youth policy. In addition, the EU identified youth integration 
through educational and cultural exchanges, as an important priority for the EU-Ukrainian 
neighborhood policy. Ukraine and the EU developed a strategic EU funded partnership, which 
focuses on creating educational youth exchanges between Ukraine and various EU member 
states. Unlike Ukraine such integration was viewed as highly negative in Russia. Russian 
policies emphasize the importance of combating foreign political influences.  
5. Surprisingly, the Orange revolution had no significant effect on national youth policy.  Unlike 
Russian policy which was changed drastically to prevent the emergence of a similar youth 
revolutionary movements, Ukrainian policy under Victor Yushchenko was mainly a continuation 
of the previously established doctrine.   
 
6. Ukrainian youth legislation devotes significant attention to increasing cooperation between 
political youth organizations, federal, and local government. Youth doctrine aims to facilitate 
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greater youth involvement in the creation of youth policy through providing financial assistance 
and governmental sponsored training and annual competitions for youth organizations. 
 
7. Youth legislation included broader goals to facilitate the overall improvement in the 
socioeconomic standards of Ukrainian youth.  
Conclusion 
The national youth doctrine remained largely untouched throughout various 
governmental regimes.  Youth legislation highlighted the importance of creating an active civil 
society, promoting patriotic education, developing international youth cooperation, integrating 
Ukrainian youth into the European and International community, and promoting Ukrainian 
values.  Financing of the youth policy was assigned to federal and local governments. In 
addition, non-governmental involvement in creation of youth legislation is identified as highly 
desirable. The policy also mandates the creation of regional youth programs.  
Ukrainian youth doctrine reflects an attempt by government officials to create a 
democratically oriented socialization agenda. However, the absence of sufficient emphasis on the 
creation of an educated and active youth civic society is evident. Of particular note, is the lack of 
programs devoted to civic education of youth. Due to a lack of substantial knowledge regarding 
the constitution and various governmental institutions, it seems likely that the youth will not be 
able to efficiently and intelligently execute their civic duties. The definition of patriotism also 
generates a degree of concern since the youth doctrine equated the definition of patriotism to 
signify passive love for Ukraine, its culture and traditions. Consequently to be a patriot in 
Ukraine means passively accepting the status quo of economic and political affairs. Defined in 
such a manner, patriotism contradicts the civic activism agenda of the youth doctrine. Moreover, 
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prioritization of patriotic education over other governmental socialization objectives, 
demonstrates the flaws of what, on face value, is deemed to be a democratic youth doctrine.    
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Evaluation 
 
The goal of this section is to provide comprehensive evaluation of governmental 
capabilities to execute successful political socialization policies. The evaluation focuses on 
assessing the strength of institutions responsible for the execution of policies, including 
budgetary provisions. The section provides additional assessments of governmental youth 
policies by monitoring youth attitudes1. Empirical assessment of youth attitudes attempts to 
demonstrate whether any change in youth sentiments were consistent with policy objectives. 
Ideally, an empirical analysis should focus on assessing youth attitudes on all of the most crucial 
ideological objectives of governmental youth policies. However, due to the limitations of 
available data, this study focuses on demonstrating youth interest in politics and their willingness 
to actively participate in political activities (sign a petition, attend a lawful demonstration etc.) 
over the past two decades. 
 
The collapse of communist regimes and consequential breakdown of Komsomol 
monopoly left post-Soviet republics without an established framework for the execution of youth 
policies. Countries lacked institutional, methodological, and budgetary provisions that would 
allow for the creation and implementation of youth legislation. The situation affecting youth was 
quickly recognized by authorities. However more pressing crises in nearly all areas of 
governance took precedence. Most youth policies constructed in the 1990s period consisted of a 
mixture of archaic or incoherent legislation serving mainly as temporary measures.  
1Data source and methodology: 
The World Value Survey Five Wave Aggregated File (WVS5)  (1981-2005) database used in this study contains the surveys conducted by the 
WVS from 1981 to 2008 in 87 societies, totaling more than 256.000 interviews. The World Values Survey is an ongoing academic project by 
social scientists to assess the state of sociocultural, moral, religious, and political values of different cultures around the world. For the purpose of 
this study, data were limited to the available studies for Russia: 1990 , 1996 ( sample size: 2,040), and 2006 (sample size: 2033). Ukraine: 1996 
(sample size: 2,811) 2006, and Azerbaijan: 1997 (2,002).  
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Meanwhile, the previous system of institutional oversight had disintegrated, leaving youth 
unsupervised and adrift. Growing alienation of youth from the national traditions and essential 
political values threatened the prospect for constructing a new national identity.                 
By the late 1990s the process was under way to transform initial “concept statements” into 
cohesive youth doctrines.  Strengthening of youth legislation was accommodated by 
restructuring of the institutions responsible for the execution of youth policies. 
 
Azerbaijan 
Similarly to other post-Soviet republics, Azerbaijan’s youth policies were dominated by 
Komsomol. The breakdown of communist monopoly left countries without functioning youth 
policies (Zulfugarov, 2007).  Majority of literature concurs that early youth policies were 
unsuccessful. Failure of youth legislation was attributed to the lack of national legislation, weak 
institutions, and the absence of a methodological and budgetary framework for the 
implementation of youth policies (Blum, 2007, 121). Azerbaijani authorities slowly developed 
and implemented a comprehensive youth policy in 2005. Improvements were made to the 
bureaucratic institutions and the methodological framework used for the execution and 
evaluation of youth legislation.  Despite the improvements, major problems remained intact. The 
lack of proper civic education continues to foster growing apolitical youth. Interest in politics 
and political participation continue to decline (Gardashkhanova).  Only small group of political 
elites, loyal to the current governmental administration, take part in political life of the county. 
Patriotism and anti-western sentiments are escalating.  
Rapid restructuring of post-Soviet institutions responsible for youth policy led to the 
establishment of Ministry of Sport and Youth in 1994. However, the Ministry lacked the ability 
to implement youth policy due to the absence of a national youth doctrine, inefficient financing 
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and logistics (the ministry still consists of 21 employees), and the general absence of any 
methodological framework (Muller, 1994, 637).   
Shortage of sufficient funding designated for the implementation of youth policy 
prevented the successful execution of policy objectives. Strict regulations were imposed on 
organizations that requested funds for their youth programs (Swietochowski, 1999, 423). The 
state provided financial assistance only to organization with more than 100 members. 
Furthermore, total awarded funding must not have exceeded half of the total cost of a project.  
As the result, from 1991 to 1999, due to the lack of proper financing, a third out of more than 
110 youth organizations stopped their activities. The situation gradually improved after the 
implementation of a comprehensive governmental youth policy (Roberts, 2010, 548). In 2009 the 
number of youth and NGOs increased to 170 registered organizations. 
              Despite the improvements made to the Azerbaijan’s youth doctrine in the past decade, 
many issues remain unsolved. The shortage of proper resources, absence of clear objectives, and 
the lack of coordinated actions from the government continues to prevent the successful 
implementation of youth policy (Kirmse, 2010, 382). 
 
Russia 
Evaluation of Boris Yeltsin’s youth policy 
     The outcomes of Yeltsin’s youth policy were examined in numerous studies carried out by 
governmental agents, as well as academic institutions. Most of the reports described Yeltsin’s 
effort of carrying out youth reforms as largely unsuccessful (Program of Social Reforms in the 
Russian Federation For 1996-2000). 
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     The biggest failure of Yeltsin’s reforms was attributed to the lack of proper funding 
available for the financing of the programs (Kuprijanova, 1999, 12). During the five years of 
operation (1995-1999) the program “Youth of Russia ” received only 65.8% of the funds 
approved in the federal budget, which constituted 21,2 % of the initially requested funds (Report 
about a course of fulfillment of the program “Youth of Russia” Table 1) .Majority of the goals of 
Yeltsin’s youth policy were supposed to be achieved by actions of numerous social 
organizations. However lack of proper funding created many restrictions that organizations had 
to face in order to receive governmental support for their programs. For example, in order for an 
organization to receive funds from the Ministry of Youth it had to have at least 3000 members or 
provide services to equal amount of people (Zinovieva, 2002).   
         The Vice-President of the State Committee of the Russian Federation on Youth Affairs 
G.V. Kuprijanova reported that the overall policy was seen as unsuccessful by majority of the 
youth, 55-69%. One of the reasons for such perceived failure was a large gap between the goals 
of the programs and what could actually be achieved (Nehaev, 2005). 
 By the end of 1990s, the majority of the youth was characterized as apolitical. Only 11% 
of them took any interest in the political life of the country.  More than half of the youth 
population also expressed their disbelief in the basic democratic values such as elections. The 
general trend among youth indicated a gradual drift away from politics and growing disbelief in 
Russian democracy (Zinovieva, 2002 ).  In 1999, youth identified patriotism as the least  
important association of the term “Civism”.  Only 39.3% of the youth identified themselves as 
being proud of their country. Majority of the youth (81,9%) agreed to the statement “there are so 
many uncertainties in political life of the country that the average person, like me, cannot 
understand them”. Growing political indifference was a consequence of the general belief among 
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youth that they couldn’t influence politicians. Overwhelming majority of the sampled youth (86, 
9 %) agreed to the statement “average person, like me, does not possess any power to influence 
the decisions of authorities”. At the same time politicians were viewed as corrupted by 91, 2 % 
of the sampled youth. (Zubok; 2005)  
Data from the World Value Survey supports the argument that Russia’s youth was 
becoming more irrelevant to the political situation in the country. From 1990 to 1999 youth 
confidence in the overall government remained the same with only 1,1 % of the sampled 
population having a great deal of confidence in the government, and 37,9% having none at all. 
Similar results can be seen in the amount of confidence attributed to the political parties.  In 1999 
only 0, 3 % of the sampled youth expressed having a great deal of confidence in political parties, 
and 4, 2 % in the justice system.  
Evaluation of Vladimir Putin’s youth policies. 
In 2004 the analytical journal of the Russian parliament devoted an issue to examining 
Putin’s youth policy (2001-2005).  Contributions to the issue were made from the officials 
involved with the policies as well as academics in the field.  According to the experts, the 2001-
2005 youth policy was relatively successful, especially in laying the foundations for further 
programs (Nexayev, 2005). Military-patriotic education policy objectives were particularly 
successful (Blum, 2006B). Mistrust among youth of the institutions of power increased, while 
the general interest in politics decreased. Youth consistently demonstrated less willingness to 
take part in political activities, such as participating in a lawful demonstration.  Such political 
attitudes are consistent with governmental youth doctrine, which lacks civic education agenda, 
encourages patriotism, and promotes apolitical sentiments.  
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    Inference about the success of patriotic education programs can be drawn from 
empirical data made available by the Levada Analytical Center. The Levada Center is one of the 
largest non-governmental agencies carrying out public opinion and market research in Russia.  
The main goal of patriotic education was to increase the level of patriotism among Russian 
population, in particular the youth cohort. A study, conducted by Levada center, indicated that 
more than 60% of the surveyed adolescents thought of themselves as patriots and expressed a 
feeling of growing patriotism in the country (Borysyak, 2004).  The high level of patriotism 
among Moscow’s youth indicates the relative success of patriotic education agenda. 
         The same study raised an important concern about governmental patriotic education 
agenda. Reduction of the growing ethno-nationalism and the level of intolerance to ethnic 
minorities among Russian youth was one of the fundamental goals of the patriotic education 
agenda (Evans, 2008). Despite the efforts to create greater tolerance through patriotism, research 
carried out by Levada center indicated that Moscow’s youth is becoming more intolerant and 
nationalistic (Levada, 2005). The majority of the surveyed youth expressed a xenophobic view 
toward the non-Russian population. Subjects of the study justified their intolerance by stating 
that due to increased immigration “life for Russians is becoming frightening (51%)”. The 
majority of surveyed youth also agreed with the statement “Russia for Russians”. The study 
concluded that increase in the level of patriotism generated a simultaneous increase in 
nationalism. Amplifying the level of patriotism has the potential to increase the level of 
nationalism and intolerance in Russian youth.  
Putin’s youth policies were largely unsuccessful in generating a greater level of support 
for political and social institutions (Hahn, 2008). Opinion data collected in 2003, indicated that 
an overwhelming 82% of Russian youth expressed support for the president. However, 76% of 
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surveyed youth expressed a lack of trust in political parties. About 63 % of youth expressed 
mistrust in the Russian Duma. Only 39% of youth indicated approval of the Russian Army. Such 
lack of trust could be attributed to the absence of proper civic education. The trend further 
indicates the future constraints to Russia’s democratic development.  
Political involvement of Russian youth remains negligible. Only 9% of the youth 
expressed active interest in politics (Table 2). A significant part of youth could not identity a 
political party that held similar views to their own.  More than half of the youth didn’t vote in 
1999 parliamentary elections. The willingness of youth to take part in a lawful political 
demonstration also decreased significantly (Table 3).  The level of support for democratic 
government fell to a record low of 15% (2008) which is significantly lower than previous 24% in 
2004. However, levels of support for the existing model of governance grew from 19 %  in 2004 
to 36 % in 2008.  
Large portion of Putin’s youth policies proved to be largely unsuccessful. Some of the 
failures were attributed to the ambitious and fundamentally unrealistic policy objectives, 
significant budgetary restraints, and lack of clearly defined legal and methodological framework. 
The lack of a clear legal base for youth policy resulted in many conflicts of jurisdiction between 
governmental and public organizations leading to unnecessary competition. Constant 
reformations of federal institutions placed a major constraint on the activities of non-
governmental organization that had to justify their existence to the newly restructured 
institutions. 
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                                                                   Table 1 
  Financing of the president’s program “Youth of Russia ”.   In the prices of the current year  
(Million rbl.) 
Years Declared  Finding approved to be provided by 
the federal budget  
Actual financing 
1994 20,691 No findings provided - 
1995 51,346 21,212 15,694 
1996 161,0 26,712 16,270 
1997 106,725 29,370  10,435 
1998 43,695 16,760 6,007 
1999 52,155 39,56 39,56  
Data Taken from : Program of Social Reforms in the Russian Federation For 1996-2000 
 
                                                                                  Table2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data taken from: the World Values Survey 
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Ukraine 
Consistent with Russian and Azerbaijani youth policies, Ukrainian legislation was 
operating under major financial, legal, institutional, and methodological constraints, generating 
limited success (Dilemmas of state-led nation building in Ukraine, 2002). Programs, 
implemented directly after independence, were negatively affected by the lack of clear stated 
objectives. Constant restructuring of institutions, responsible for the implementation of youth 
policies, contributed to the lack of cohesive programs. Theoretical framework established by 
previous institutions was frequently neglected, as ministries were established and quickly closed. 
Youth policies remained mainly unchanged throughout changing presidential administrations.  
 Experts identified budgetary constraints as the main barrier that prevented fully 
successful realization of the youth programs. Lack of funding was especially recognized at the 
regional level. The absence of coordinated and consistent political socialization actions from all 
governmental institutions also served as a negative factor affecting youth program.  Additionally, 
governmental inability to provide sufficient technical and methodological support to public 
youth organizations, contributed to the limited success of policies (Güneş-Ayata, 2005). 
Ukrainian youth doctrine emphasized that independent youth organizations and NGOs were 
expected to play a curtail role in executing youth policy objectives.  However, due to the lack of 
proper logistical and financial support, many youth organizations were forced to terminate their 
activities.  
Despite the improvements made to youth legislation, major constraints prevented any 
significant change to take place in the political and social conditions of youth. The lack of 
coordinated and supervised political socialization policy with clear stated objectives resulted in a 
widespread of largely untargeted programs (Way, 2005). Insufficient funding of the youth policy 
 resulted in the lack of proper logistical support for youth programs and public youth 
organizations. Most youth legislation generated only limited success. Ukrainian youth remains 
largely apolitical. Mistrust in the institutions of power is amplified (
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Conclusion 
The transition from a post-Communist society created numerous social, political and 
economic problems for all generations of citizens. Particular concerns were expressed over the 
moral and cultural degradation of the first post-Soviet generation. Authorities recognized the 
rising youth problem causing a decay of moral values, and threatening the social, economic, 
political, and cultural development of the nation. Early youth policies, particularly in Russia and 
Ukraine, were designed to assist youth in realizing their social, political, and economic potential. 
For example, in Russia, Yeltsin’s administration endeavored to foster democratic ideals amongst 
Russian youth.  One of the foremost goals of Yeltsin’s youth program was encouragement of 
greater youth participation in political and social life of the country.  Despite the relatively 
democratic goals of early youth program, the policies were unsuccessful in all three countries, 
due to a combination of factors from low funding levels and lack of a legal platform to the lack 
of a procedural foundation for the implementing of youth policies.  
  By the end of the decade, the majority of youth was classified as apolitical in all three 
countries (Table 4). For example in Russia, 82 percent of youth expressed unfamiliarity with the 
political situation in the country. Studies from 2000 indicated that youth valued money, good 
education, power, and social status as the most important objectives in life. Confidence in 
governmental institutions continued to decline, accompanied by an overall degradation of 
cultural and moral wealth amplifying mistrust, amongst youth, towards political institutions. 
As countries developed comprehensive youth doctrines, authorities once again engaged 
in enacting paternalistic policies modeled after the Soviet Union approach.  Russian and 
Azerbaijani administrations defined the younger age group as a strategic resource that should be 
utilized to battle foreign influences and ensure the prolonged continuation of the political status 
quo. Ukrainian youth policies were more tolerant of foreign political influences, exhibiting a 
44 
 
more democratic tendency.  In the aftermath of Ukraine’s Orange revolution, Russian and 
Azerbaijan youth were additionally viewed as a potentially undesirable source of popular 
discontent that needed to be tempered; mainly through the imposition of a patriotic ideology. 
Consequently, youth policies focused on creation of a more patriotic youth polity that would 
embrace nationalistic values, while remaining loyal to the incumbent regimes and resist 
manipulations from political opponents.  
In addition to their ideological focus, all youth policies endeavored to create an 
economically active youth populace with decreased dependency on state sponsored welfare 
handouts. Moreover, youth in all three countries was motivated to take part in the social rather 
than political life of the country.  
The efficacy of national reforms to youth policy is contentious and debatable. Due to the 
recurring problems of inadequate funding, many of the programs were once again ineffectively 
implemented leading to a gradual degradation of youth’s trust in government. Youth continue to 
have little faith in the institutions of power, with the exception of the presidency. However, the 
most important goal of national youth policies--patriotic education--proved to be successful, as 
there is a general rise in the level of patriotism. In Russia, this has been accompanied by an 
increasing nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes amongst the youth; both could be a direct result 
of the increase in patriotic indoctrination.  It should be noted that this rise in patriotism could 
have been caused by certain other factors beyond the scope of this investigation   
Post-Soviet youth policies of Russian, Azerbaijani and to a lesser degree Ukrainian, 
administrations engaged in a top-down approach to youth political socialization. Administrations 
were motivated in their policies due to what they interpreted as the continual socio-political 
degradation of youth. While Ukrainian reforms encouraged some degree of political involvement 
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of youth;Russian and Azerbaijani youth policies focused on utilizing that very potential of youth 
to advance governmental political aims by maintaining the status quo. Azerbaijani and 
particularly Russian youth policies were implemented in order to increase the level of youth 
patriotism and political support, while assisting the administration in combating extremism and 
foreign influences.  
Interestingly, none of the youth policies focused on political education of youth, an 
important factor in alleviating the pains of a newly established political regime. A politically 
educated citizenry possesses knowledge regarding the framework and structure of a political 
regime in order to assist them in better fulfillment of their civic duties. Moreover, due to the fact 
that youth is generally apolitical, even in established democratic regimes, civic education should 
be not only encouraged it must also be accompanied by efforts to generate greater youth interest 
in the political life of the country. In post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine none of the 
youth policies identify political education as an important goal, with all administrations simply 
ignoring civic education as an important aim of youth policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Table 5 
 
 
Data taken from the World Values Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2%
24%
47%
27%
6%
42%
35%
17%
8%
34%
31%
27%
Very interested Somewhat interested Not very interested Not at all interested
Youth Interest in Politics 
Russia Ukraine Azerbaijan 
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Discussion 
Political socialization has been largely associated with the study of American political 
behavior. However, a growing stack literature has indicated that the field could prove to be 
beneficial in studying comparative and international politics.    
This study focused on expanding the field of political socialization research by using the 
framework to examine youth socialization in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Russia, and Ukraine. There 
has been a growing concern overan increasing socio-political drift in the populace towards more 
authoritarian regimes in post-Soviet states. This study indicates that political socialization 
framework is a useful analytical tool for analyzing the ideological nature of newly established 
regimes. Utilizing the political socialization framework, this study identified a new patriotic 
youth ideology which the current administrations are implementing.  
The results of the study have implications beyond expanding the field of political 
socialization. The new largely patriotic youth policy should raise concerns for international 
observers of post-Soviet democratic development. An increase in the level of patriotism among 
youth, particularly in Russia, indicates that governmental socialization policies are beginning to 
show results. Furthermore, Russian and Azerbaijani nationalistic socialization policies are likely 
to produce youth intolerant of western democratic influences. Regional studies already indicate a 
drastic decrease in youth approval of a western style democratic model in Russia and Azerbaijan. 
Assuming that no actions are taken by international community to provide greater education for 
youth about western values, Azerbaijani, Russian, and to a lesser degree Ukrainian political 
future is likely to take an authoritative character when the patriotic and largely nationalistic 
youth come of age politically. 
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An interesting development and a potential limitation to political socialization framework 
is the interaction between successful implementation of political socialization with the economic 
stabilization and growth in a country. As evidenced by Russian youth socialization policies, 
implemented during rising per capita income levels, it is hard to determine what the penetration 
of such policies would have been under a more economically unstable environment. Further 
research should focus on how economic stability affects implementation of authoritarian 
socialization policies, particularly what kind of affect does the economic condition of the 
individual have on his ability to submit to state-sponsored socialization. The idea is simple; how 
willing would individuals be to forego personal freedom and accept the state’s civic education if 
their economic needs and wants are not properly met by the state.  National youth socialization 
policies were prescient due to their focus on providing economic opportunities for the youth. As 
such, it is hard to examine the exact affects of youth socialization independent of the economic 
preconditions in this particular case. Further research should focus characterizing and evaluating 
the interaction between political socialization and economics. 
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Primary Sources 
 
 Russian Government Documents 
 
 Decree by the Government of the Russian Federation “About military-patriotic youth and 
children’s organizations”.The document available in Russian at 
http://www.mnogozakonov.ru/catalog/date/2000/7/24/15426/ 
 
Decree by the Government of the Russian Federation About Federal Purpose-oriented Program 
“Russian Youth (2001-2005)”. Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian 
Federation.Federal Ministry of Education.   The document available in Russian at  
http://www.ed.gov.ru/ntp/fp/mr/pp1015/664/ 
 
Federal Program “Russian Youth (2001-2005): efficiency and prospects.” The document is 
available in Russian at  
http://uisrussia.msu.ru/docs/http/www.budgetrf.ru/Publications/Magazines/VestnikSF/2004/vestn
iksf251-31/vestniksf251-31000.htm 
 
Patriotic education of citizens of the Russian Federation (2001-2005). The document available in 
Russian at   
http://www.deti.llr.ru/content/47 
 
 The strategy of governmental youth policy of Russian Federation until the year of 2016. The 
document is available in Russian at 
http://vmo.rgub.ru/policy/act/strategy.php 
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